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The Little Statute that Gets No Respect: How Courts 
Have Ignored the Administrative Procedure Act with 
Respect to Whether Pre-Enforcement Challenge 
Provisions Are Exclusive 
Arthur G. Sapper* 
This article discusses a provision of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) that the federal courts have failed to apply—the third sentence of 
section 703, which states: “Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and 
exclusive opportunity for judicial review is provided by law, agency action 
is subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial 
enforcement.”1 The provision means, in essence, that when one is accused 
of violating an agency regulation, one may challenge its validity. Section 
703’s third sentence also supplies criteria to determine when the right to 
challenge may be denied: when the law provides a pre-enforcement 
challenge that is “adequate” and “exclusive.” 
Instead of applying those criteria, however, the federal courts have 
developed their own. This is unfortunate. First, the results they have 
reached have been mixed and inconsistent with section 703. Yet, “[t]he 
APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and 
diversity.”2 Second, and more important, statutes are not supposed to be 
ignored. Yet, no court of appeals has ever considered section 703 in its 
discussions of whether a pre-enforcement challenge provision is 
exclusive. 
This article describes the cases on the exclusivity of pre-enforcement 
challenge provisions under one representative statute and shows that many 
of these decisions are inconsistent with section 703. It also suggests some 
reasons why courts have applied judge-made law instead of the APA 
provision, and recommends that the Supreme Court take a step to rectify 
the problem. 
* Senior Counsel, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Washington, D.C.; former
deputy general counsel, Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission; former special counsel, 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission; former adjunct professor of occupational safety 
and health law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C. 
1. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2018).
2. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999). 
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I. Background: The Judge-Made Law on the Exclusivity of
Pre-Enforcement Challenge Provisions 
At one time, case law generally stated that one may raise the validity 
of a federal regulation when it was enforced.3 In fact, “the courts typically 
reviewed the lawfulness of an agency’s rule, not when it was promulgated, 
but when it was enforced.”4 It was not until 1967, in Abbott Laboratories 
v. Gardner, that the Supreme Court broadly held that adversely affected
persons may also obtain pre-enforcement review of the validity of a
regulation even if a statute does not expressly provide for it.5
Suppose a statute does expressly provide for pre-enforcement review 
of the validity of a regulation but is silent on whether such review is the 
exclusive way that one may challenge the regulation’s validity. There are 
several such pre-enforcement review provisions, such as those in the 
Administrative Orders Review Act (sometimes known as the Hobbs Act),6 
the Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”),7 and the Food, Drug 
and Cosmetics Act.8 They provide for fifty-nine- or sixty-day periods for 
such review but do not state that they are exclusive. Are they exclusive? 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has several times addressed the question, most notably in JEM 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC. There, it held that where a statute provides a 
limited period for pre-enforcement review of a regulation’s validity, and 
that opportunity for review is adequate, that period is exclusive as to so-
called “procedural” invalidity arguments, but not exclusive as to so-called 
“substantive” invalidity arguments.9 According to that court: 
3. E.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 181 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir.
1950) (“Even if petitioner is unable to prove the irreparable injury necessary in a suit for injunction, 
he may raise the invalidity of the Commission’s action as a defense to an enforcement proceeding 
instituted against him for violation of the rule in question.”); see also Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, 
387 U.S. 167, 185 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“[E]xcept for [certain] instances . . . , the avenue for 
attack upon the statute and regulations has been by defense to specific enforcement actions by the 
agency.”); Abbott Lab’ys v. Celebrezze, 352 F.2d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 1965) (“[I]f enforcement should 
be attempted . . . there are provisions for administrative hearing and review by the Court of Appeals.”), 
rev’d on other grounds, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
4. STEPHEN G. BREYER & RICHARD B. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY 
POLICY 1136 (2d ed. 1985). 
5. 387 U.S. 136 (1967). 
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (2018).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (2018). 
8. 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (2018). 
9. 22 F.3d 320, 324–25 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concerning the Hobbs Act) (citing Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 939 F.2d 1035, 1040 (D.C. Cir. 1991); NLRB Union v. FLRA, 834 F.2d 191, 
195–97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (summarizing circuit law with respect to various types of challenges); Nat. 
Res. Defense Council v. NRC, 666 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Geller v. FCC, 610 F.2d 973, 977–78 
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A substantive defense is one based on an argument that a regulation is 
not authorized by a statute or the Constitution, as opposed to a claim under 
the APA regarding the method used in promulgating the regulation, such 
as that it was issued without adequate notice, or that the government 
inadequately responded to comments.10 
For defendants to properly raise a procedural invalidity defense, they 
must have sued the agency within the pre-enforcement review period 
(often sixty but sometimes as short as thirty days).11 This bar applies even 
to entities that did not exist during the pre-enforcement challenge period.12 
Under the D.C. Circuit’s line of cases, exclusivity depends on adequacy 
alone, without an independent showing that Congress intended 
exclusivity.13 
Some other circuits have followed JEM Broadcasting.14 Some have 
done so even when the issue was not technically presented.15 The Supreme 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 546–47 (D.C. Cir. 1958), 
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 813 (1959)). A careful reading of Functional Music fails to uncover any basis 
for that court’s later reliance on it to distinguish between substantive and procedural challenges. 
Although the legal theory underlying the challenge there was what JEM Broadcasting would later 
characterize as “substantive” (a challenge to the statutory authority for the regulations), Functional 
Music drew no such distinction. It never used the words “procedural” or “substantive,” and its 
language was unqualifiedly broad, permitting challenges to “validity” generally. 274 F.2d at 546–47. 
10. Coal River Energy, LLC v. Jewell, 751 F.3d 659, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
11. But see Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (“The 30-day limitation on judicial review imposed by the Clean Air Act would afford 
precariously little time for many affected persons even if some adequate method of notice were 
afforded. It also is totally unrealistic to assume that more than a fraction of the persons and entities 
affected by a regulation—especially small contractors scattered across the country—would have 
knowledge of its promulgation or familiarity with or access to the Federal Register.”). 
12. Coal River Energy, 751 F.3d at 663.
13. See JEM Broad., 22 F.3d at 326. Since JEM Broadcasting was issued, the D.C. Circuit
also issued opinions on the issue in Coal River Energy, 751 F.3d 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Reclamation 
Act), and in Independent Community Bankers of America v. Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 195 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Bank Holding Company Act). 
14. Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2016); Arctic Express, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Transp., 194 F.3d 767, 770 (6th Cir. 1999); Florilli Corp. v. Pena, 118 F.3d 1212, 1214 (8th 
Cir. 1997). For pre-JEM Broadcasting cases outside the D.C. Circuit but following the D.C. Circuit’s 
analysis in pre-JEM Broadcasting cases, see, e.g., Legal Env’t Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 
F.3d 1467, 1473 (11th Cir. 1997) and Advance Transp. Co. v. United States, 884 F.2d 303, 305 (7th 
Cir. 1989).
15. See Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 263 (2d Cir. 2009) (applying JEM 
Broadcasting, seemingly unnecessarily, to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)); Commonwealth of Pa. Dep’t of Pub. 
Welfare v. HHS, 101 F.3d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1996) (also applying JEM Broadcasting, seemingly 
unnecessarily, to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a)). If the statute of limitations at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) applies, then 
there would appear no reason to invoke JEM Broadcasting. Section 2401(a) does not, however, apply 
to the timeliness of invalidity defenses when the Government enforces a regulation. First, it applies by 
its terms only to suits against the Government, not by the Government. Steffen v. United States, 213 
F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1954) (“That section is limited to actions against the United States. We cannot
by analogy make it apply to actions brought by the United States.”) (emphasis in the original); Phila. 
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Court has cited JEM Broadcasting, albeit in dicta, for the proposition that 
“a party might be foreclosed in some instances from challenging the 
procedures used to promulgate a given rule”16—a statement that could 
equally describe the intended result of applying section 703. 
II. The Wages of Ignoring APA § 703
Not once in the development of this line of judge-made law, under any 
statutory scheme, did any circuit mention, let alone apply, section 703. The 
result is a checkered pattern of holdings and disagreements among the 
circuits. An illustration of this can be gleaned from case law developments 
under the OSH Act. That statute has a fifty-nine-day pre-enforcement 
challenge period that, as with the Hobbs Act and other statutes mentioned 
above, is silent on whether it is exclusive.17 
A. An Example: Case Law under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act 
In summary, four circuits have permitted at least some substantive and 
procedural challenges to OSHA standards (the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and 
D.C.), with some question about the Third Circuit. The Fifth Circuit agreed
that challenges are permitted unless an employer participated in both a
rulemaking and a pre-enforcement suit. The D.C. Circuit recently
equivocated on one point, as discussed below. In contrast, two circuits (the
Eighth Circuit and perhaps the Sixth Circuit) permit substantive but not
procedural challenges. The picture in the Fourth Circuit is unclear.
Indem. Ins. Co. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., 771 F.3d 391, 401 & n.7 (7th Cir. 2014) (“An affirmative defense 
is not a ‘claim’” or “cause of action.”). Second, statutes of limitation by their nature do not foreclose 
defensive arguments. United States v. W. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 72 (1956) (the limitations period has 
“no relevance to” defensive arguments. “They are aimed at lawsuits, not at the consideration of 
particular issues in lawsuits.”); TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 271 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing W. Pac. 
R.R., 352 U.S. 59 at 72); Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 545, 549 n.3 (2d Cir. 1963)
(“[L]imitations do not normally run against a defense.”). 
16. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (2018). Also referred to as OSH Act § 6(f), the first sentence of which
reads as follows: “Any person who may be adversely affected by a standard issued under this section 
may at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such standard is promulgated file a petition challenging 
the validity of such standard with the United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein such person 
resides or has his principal place of business, for a judicial review of such standard.” 
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1. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit, in Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. OSHRC, was 
the first court to consider whether the OSH Act’s pre-enforcement 
challenge provision is exclusive.18 The court did not start its discussion 
with the general rule, embodied in prior case law and section 703, that 
validity may be challenged during enforcement. Instead, the court asked 
whether Congress intended to “authoriz[e] review of a standard’s validity 
at the enforcement stage.”19 The court concluded that a House bill and 
report showed that Congress intended to permit such challenges,20 and that 
“policy considerations” indicated that they should be admitted.21 The 
Third Circuit thus concluded, at first, that adjudicators could “deny 
enforcement to a standard determined by it to have been issued in violation 
of the Act’s substantive or procedural requirements.”22 
Later, the opinion provided an alternative reason for this conclusion, 
one resting on administrative law principles—that judicial review of 
validity is ordinarily permitted during enforcement; that the mere 
existence of a pre-enforcement challenge provision did not suffice to show 
that Congress intended that provision to be exclusive; and that a contrary 
result required “an explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction.”23 And had the 
court stopped here, its analysis would have paralleled the analysis required 
by section 703. 
Unfortunately, the Third Circuit then set out an unsupported, 
confused, and policy-laden dictum on a question not before it based on 
reasoning inconsistent with section 703. It stated that a prosecuted 
employer “cannot defend solely on the ground that . . . procedural 
[rulemaking] requirements . . . have been ignored by the Secretary. To 
carry its burden the [employer] must produce evidence showing why the 
standard under review, as applied to it, is arbitrary, capricious, 
18. 534 F.2d 541, 548–49 (3d Cir. 1976). 
19. Id. at 549 n.10 (emphasis added).
20. Id. at 548–49, citing H.R. 16785, 91st Cong § 11(b) (1970) and H.R.REP. NO. 91-1291, at 
24, 41 (1970). 
21. Id. at 549–50.
22. Id. at 550.
23. Id. at 551. The Third Circuit stated: “We do not find, from the availability of limited pre-
enforcement judicial review permitted under § 6(f) [29 U.S.C. § 655(f)] and the silence with respect 
to legal issues in § 11(a) [29 U.S.C. § 660(a), the provision for judicial review of the outcome of an 
enforcement proceeding], an intention to limit the scope of judicial review in the enforcement 
proceeding. Judicial review at that stage is, after all, the ordinarily preferred method. See Toilet Goods 
Ass’n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163–64 (1967). Absent an explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction, we will 
entertain affirmative defenses attacking the validity of an administrative regulation that is brought to 
us for enforcement.” 
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unreasonable or contrary to law.”24 The court failed to explain why an 
agency that seeks to enforce a regulation adopted in violation of APA 
rulemaking requirements would not thereby be acting “contrary to law.” 
After all, an invalid regulation is a nullity.25 Worse, the reason that the 
court gave for this dictum—that a contrary holding “would effectively 
nullify the congressional circumscription of the right to petition for review 
of an OSHA standard”—was inconsistent with the court’s own reading of 
the legislative history, which showed Congress intended to permit validity 
challenges during enforcement.26 In sum, the opinion was an internally 
inconsistent muddle. 
2. Fourth Circuit
In Daniel International Corp. v. OSHRC, the Fourth Circuit noted a 
split that had by then developed in the circuits but avoided a ruling, 
rejecting the validity challenge there on a harmless error ground.27 
3. Fifth Circuit
In Deering Milliken, Inc. v. OSHRC, the Fifth Circuit relied on 
Supreme Court case law requiring “a clear command before limiting 
judicial review”28 and the OSH Act’s legislative history, particularly a 
Senate report stating that section 655(f) “does not foreclose an employer 
from challenging the validity of a standard during an enforcement 
proceeding.”29 It then turned to an unusual situation presented by the OSH 
Act: In 1971, OSHA had under a special grant of statutory authority 
summarily adopted hundreds of standards, without notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. The court held that employers could not have had an adequate 
opportunity to challenge those hundreds of standards during the fifty-nine-
day challenge period provided by OSH Act section 6(f).30 
24. Id. at 551–52.
25. Functional Music, Inc. v. FCC, 274 F.2d 543, 547–48 (“[I]f the rules were invalid, they
are a nullity . . . .”); see also Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 2005); MCI Telecomms. 
Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1142–43 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (invalidating rule for inadequate notice); Idaho 
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Ordinarily when a regulation is 
not promulgated in compliance with the APA, the regulation is invalid.”). 
26. Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, 534 F.2d at 548–49; see supra note 20.
27. 656 F.2d 925, 930 (4th Cir. 1981). 
28. 630 F.2d 1094, 1099 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167 (1970)). 
29. Id. at 1099 (quoting S. REP. NO. 91–1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5184). 
30. Id. OSH Act § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 655(a), required the Labor Department to, within two 
years (that is, between 1971 and 1973), adopt so-called “established Federal standards” (standards 
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In RSR Corp. v. Donovan, the Fifth Circuit held that: 
[W]hen an employer has participated in [an OSHA notice-and-comment]
rulemaking and [a] pre-enforcement review of an OSHA regulation and
could have then asserted either a substantive or procedural challenge to
its validity, but did not, and has no excuse for its failure to do so, we will
not entertain the challenge in an enforcement proceeding.31
4. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit’s discussion in Advance Bronze, Inc. v. Dole is 
unclear, veering between the merits and the court’s authority to consider 
the issue.32 At first, the court seemed to say that the challenge there—a 
protest against the absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking—lacked 
merit because a special provision of the OSH Act permitted summary 
adoption.33 But it then cited with favor the Eighth Circuit’s holding in 
National Industrial Constructors Inc. v. OSHRC,34 and stated that “this 
court will not allow Advance to escape liability by raising a procedural 
attack upon” the standard.35 
5. Eighth Circuit
At first, the Eighth Circuit broadly held that employers could 
challenge the validity of OSHA standards during enforcement. In 
Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc. v. OSHRC, the employer challenged 
a standard’s validity, arguing that it was infeasible as applied.36 The court 
stated that “[i]t is clear from the legislative history . . . that judicial review 
adopted under other federal statutes) and “national consensus standards” (private standards adopted 
by industry) as standards enforceable under the OSH Act. OSHA was required to act summarily—that 
is, without notice-and-comment rulemaking or findings (such as feasibility) that it would otherwise 
have been required to make. OSHA adopted the vast bulk of such standards within a few weeks after 
the Act’s April 28, 1971, effective date and nearly all at once. See 36 Fed. Reg. 10466 (May 29, 1971), 
adopting hundreds of provisions. The provision under which nearly all subsequent standards were 
adopted is OSH Act § 6(b), 29 U.S.C. § 655(b). 
31. 747 F.2d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 1984). In Kiewit Pwr. Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 959 F.3d 
381, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (discussed infra note 47 and accompanying text), the D.C. Circuit 
distinguished RSR from the usual challenge to a standard during enforcement on the ground that, 
“[RSR] participated not only in the notice-and-comment process mandated by section 6(b), but also in 
pre-enforcement judicial review under section 6(f).” 
32. 917 F.2d 944, 951–52 (6th Cir. 1990). 
33. Id. See supra note 30.
34. 583 F.2d 1048, 1052 (8th Cir. 1978). 
35. Advance Bronze, 917 F.2d at 952.
36. 529 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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during the enforcement stage is intended,” citing the Senate report.37 The 
court also stated that “such review is consistent with the rule that judicial 
review is to be presumed.”38 
In National Industrial Constructors, Inc. v. OSHRC, however, the 
Eighth Circuit retreated from the broad language in Arkansas-Best.39 It 
held that “a challenge to the validity of an OSHA regulation, based solely 
upon [OSHA’s] failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the 
APA, OSHA, or any other applicable statute, may only be raised in a pre-
enforcement proceeding instituted pursuant to” OSH Act section 6(f).40 
“Such attacks may not be raised in an enforcement proceeding.”41 It held 
that substantive challenges, however, may always be mounted.42 
6. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit held that it would not “foreclose a challenge to the
procedural validity of an OSHA regulation in the absence of express 
authorization from Congress,” and that the Senate report’s “language . . . 
is clear.”43 
7. D.C. Circuit
In Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Secretary of Labor, the D.C. Circuit
noted the circuit split but stated: 
We have considered the evidence of congressional intent put forward in 
these cases, and we agree with the majority view that Congress intended 
review of the validity of [OSHA] standards to be available in 
enforcement proceedings before the Commission, and that Congress 
drew no distinction between procedural and substantive challenges in 
this regard.44 
The opinion added, “[W]e are doing no more than interpreting 
congressional intent as to the preclusive effects of OSHA’s provision for 
37. Id. at 653 (citing S. Rep. No. 91–1282). 
38. Id.
39. 583 F.2d at 1052–53 (8th Cir. 1978). 
40. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (2018); id. at 1052. 
41. Nat’l Indus. Constructors, Inc., 583 F.2d at 1053.
42. Id. at 1052.
43. Marshall v. Union Oil Co., 616 F.2d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Noblecraft
Indus., Inc. v. Sec’y of Lab., 614 F.2d 199, 201–02 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[V]alidity of the standard can be 
challenged in this review of the enforcement order.”). 
44. 766 F.2d 575, 582 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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pre-enforcement review.”45 In General Carbon Co. v. OSHRC, the court 
characterized Simplex as “clearly” holding that validity challenges during 
enforcement are permitted.46 
While this article was in preparation, events occurred in the D.C. 
Circuit that shed light on the article’s thesis. In Kiewit Power Construction 
Co. v. Secretary of Labor, an employer challenged the validity of a 1971 
amendment, without notice-and-comment rulemaking or statutorily 
required findings, of an OSHA standard adopted under OSH Act 
section 6(a).47 That provision permitted OSHA, for the two-year period 
between 1971 and 1973 and without regard to the APA and the OSH Act’s 
regular rulemaking provision (OSH Act section 6(b)), to adopt certain 
workplace safety standards.48 The court requested supplemental briefs on 
whether JEM Broadcasting had, despite Simplex, foreclosed the 
challenge.49 
In response, the employer argued that JEM Broadcasting had no such 
effect, citing unusually detailed evidence in the OSH Act’s legislative 
history that Congress specifically intended non-exclusivity.50 The 
employer also argued that APA section 703 “directly addresses this issue” 
and that, unlike the JEM Broadcasting line of cases, the mere adequacy of 
a pre-enforcement challenge provision “cannot alone prove that it is 
‘exclusive’ [under APA section 703]—or ‘exclusive’ would . . . be 
effectively read out of the statute.”51 The employer acknowledged that its 
argument “treads a different path than the doctrine developed” in circuit 
precedents but observed that they had “not indicate[d] . . . that this Court 
[had] examined this matter in light of APA section 703.”52 The employer 
stated that “[w]hile re-examination in light of § 703 would ordinarily be 
appropriate” (citing two Supreme Court cases discarding judge-made law 
in favor of APA provisions (discussed infra in Parts III A and B)), the 
clarity of the legislative history made re-examination unnecessary.53 
45. Id.
46. 860 F.2d 479, 483–84 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
47. 29 U.S.C. § 665(a) (2018); 959 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2020). This writer was counsel for the
employer there. 
48. See supra note 30.
49. Kiewit Power, 959 F.3d at 391.
50. Supplemental Brief of Kiewit Power, 2019 WL 5677848 at *5–10 (No. 11-2395) in Kiewit 
Power. 
51. Id. at *10–11.
52. Id. at *12.
53. Id. 
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The court’s decision did not mention APA section 703, even though it 
had been prominently briefed; the court stated that it “d[id] not reach” the 
employer’s other arguments.54 Instead, based on the OSH Act’s legislative 
history, the court reaffirmed Simplex’s holding that the OSH Act “allows 
for a procedural challenge in an enforcement proceeding, at least for 
section 6(a) standards.”55 That last phrase could, however, be read to imply 
that exclusivity might apply to procedural challenges to standards adopted 
under the OSH Act’s regular rulemaking provision, section 6(b).56 If so, 
the phrase is inconsistent with the OSH Act’s legislative history (on which 
the court purported to rely) and with APA section 703 (which it purported 
not to reach), neither of which draws or suggests that distinction. The 
phrase is also inconsistent with D.C. Circuit precedent, for in General 
Carbon the court had permitted a challenge to a standard adopted under 
OSH Act section 6(b).57 
B. The Judge-Made Law is Inconsistent with APA § 703
The problem with the judge-made law exemplified by JEM 
Broadcasting is that it is inconsistent with APA section 703’s third 
sentence. 
First, APA section 703 states a general rule permitting all validity 
challenges during enforcement proceedings. It states that “agency action 
is subject to judicial review in civil . . . proceedings for judicial 
enforcement.”58 By contrast, the general rule of JEM Broadcasting and its 
progeny is that “procedural attacks on a rule’s adoption are barred.”59 
Second, APA section 703’s text provides only a narrow exception to 
its general rule: the prior opportunity for judicial review must be 
“adequate” and “exclusive.” The exception treats adequacy and 
exclusiveness as separate elements that must both be independently 
54. Kiewit Power, 959 F.3d at 392.
55. Id.
56. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (2018); id. at 391. The Kiewit Power court stated: “[T]hat generalized
principles of finality may bar untimely procedural attacks under other statutes says nothing about the 
viability of such a challenge under the OSH Act. . . . Indicia of congressional intent can vary from one 
statute to another and we must take care to conduct an individualized inquiry. . . . We see no reason to 
disregard Simplex’s determination that the OSH Act allows for a procedural challenge in an 
enforcement proceeding, at least for section 6(a) standards.” 
57. Gen. Carbon Co. v. OSHRC, 860 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1988). General Carbon concerned
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200, adopted in 1983 under OSH Act § 6(b). 48 Fed. Reg. 53280, 53320 (1983) 
(stating authority for standard). 
58. 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2018) (emphasis added).
59. Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 195 F.3d 28 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (summarizing JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 22 F.3d at 325). 
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proved. By contrast, JEM Broadcasting infers exclusiveness from 
adequacy alone.60 
Third, the use of the word “[e]xcept” by APA section 703 means that 
the burden of proving exclusivity should fall on the agency asserting it, 
not the private party resisting it.61 By contrast, JEM Broadcasting placed 
the burden of establishing non-exclusivity on the private party.62 
Fourth, APA section 703 draws no distinction between procedural and 
substantive challenges, or between regulations adopted under one 
provision but not another. By contrast, JEM Broadcasting distinguishes 
between procedural and substantive challenges, and the D.C. Circuit in 
Kiewit suggested a possible distinction between standards adopted under 
OSH Act sections 6(a) and 6(b).63 
Putting these differences together, APA section 703 creates a regime 
strikingly inconsistent with that created by the JEM Broadcasting line of 
cases. 
What evidence would suffice to show exclusivity within the meaning 
of section 703? It should presumably suffice for exclusivity to be stated 
expressly, to be clearly implied by other language of the statute, or perhaps 
to be clearly stated in its legislative history. For example, a provision of 
the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act states that a post-promulgation 
petition is “the exclusive means of challenging the validity of” mine safety 
standards.64 
What cannot logically suffice, however, is silence, the existence of a 
merely adequate pre-enforcement provision, or a judge’s idea of good 
policy. The exception in APA section 703 is so worded that a court must 
affirmatively conclude that a pre-enforcement challenge provision is 
exclusive. It is difficult to see how such a conclusion could be drawn if the 
pre-enforcement provision and its legislative history are both silent on the 
point. And inasmuch as APA section 703 expressly requires courts to find 
both adequacy and exclusivity, inferring exclusivity from mere adequacy 
60. JEM Broad., 22 F.3d at 326 (looking to adequacy alone); see infra quotation at note 62.
61. Action on Smoking & Health v. CAB, 713 F.2d 795, 801 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also
Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“exception”). 
62. JEM Broad., 22 F.3d at 326 (“[U]nder our established law, the result might differ if it 
could be shown that no party ever had adequate opportunity to challenge a particular agency action.” 
(emphasis added)). The court emphasized that non-exclusivity, rather than exclusivity, would be an 
“exception.” Id. (“Thus, we have recognized exceptions to the limitations period when agency action 
fails to put aggrieved parties on reasonable notice of the rule’s content, or when such action remains 
unripe for judicial review throughout the statutory review period.”). 
63. See supra the court’s statement quoted at note 56.
64. 30 U.S.C. § 811(d) (2018). 
BYU Journal of Public Law [Vol. 35 
12 
(as JEM Broadcasting does) would fail to give independent meaning to 
the key word “exclusive” and would effectively read it out of the statute. 
As to a judge’s idea of good policy, “[j]udicial action must be 
governed by standard, by rule, and [it] must be principled, rational, and 
based upon reasoned distinctions found in the . . . laws.”65 A finding of 
exclusivity not drawn from tangible evidence of congressional intent 
would violate that principle. 
The above approach to APA section 703’s exception was evident in 
the recent separate opinion by Justice Kavanaugh, speaking for himself 
and three other justices in PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris 
Chiropractic.66 The statute there was the Hobbs Act, the pre-enforcement 
provision of which is silent on whether it is exclusive.67 Justice Kavanaugh 
reasoned that “elementary principles of administrative law establish that 
the proper default rule is to allow review” of the agency’s position unless 
exclusivity is stated “expressly” and hence that the “silence” of the Hobbs 
Act on exclusivity was insufficient.68 
Justice Kavanaugh’s view was soon endorsed by Judges Newsom and 
Branch of the Eleventh Circuit in their concurring opinion in Gorss 
Motels, Inc. v. Safemark Systems, LP.69 Quoting Justice Kavanaugh, they 
wrote that “‘elementary principles of administrative law establish that the 
proper default rule is to allow [judicial] review’ unless Congress says 
otherwise,” and that judicial review during enforcement must be 
“expressly preclude[d].”70 
III. An Unfortunate Pattern of Ignoring the APA
Section 703’s third sentence is not the only APA provision that courts 
have ignored. Some examples follow. 
65. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507 (2019).
66. 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2057 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment). 
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (2018).
68. PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. at 2058–62.
69. 931 F.3d 1094, 1105–12 (11th Cir. 2019). 
70. Id. at 1109. They also wrote: “At least in the ordinary case, our precedents task all persons
with both the foreknowledge—some would say the clairvoyance—to identify any agency orders that 
might concern them in future litigation and the resources to bring an immediate challenge against each 
of those orders. ‘Requiring all those potentially affected parties to bring a facial, pre-enforcement 
challenge within 60 days or otherwise forfeit their right to challenge an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute borders on the absurd.’” Id. at 1110 (quoting PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2062 (2019) 
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the judgment)). Judges Newsom and Branch also quoted with approval 
Justice Powell’s concurrence in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 290 (1978). See 
quotation supra note 11. 
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A. Exhaustion of Administrative Appeals
Before 1993, several federal appellate courts followed a judicially 
created doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.71 In Darby v. 
Cisneros, however, the Supreme Court held that in many cases APA 
section 704 “plainly” does not require exhaustion when the judge-made 
doctrine would have required it.72 The Court noted, with an air of 
exasperation, that Professor Kenneth Culp Davis had stated in his 1958 
treatise73 that this provision “had been almost completely ignored in 
judicial opinions,” and that Professor Davis had “reiterated that 
observation 25 years later” in his treatise’s later edition.74 In putting aside 
the judge-made rule, the Court stated: “Courts are not free to impose an 
exhaustion requirement as a rule of judicial administration where the 
agency action has already become ‘final’ under” the APA.75 
B. Non-APA Scope of Review of Agency Factual Findings
For many years, the Federal Circuit reviewed findings of fact by the 
Patent and Trademark Office under a judge-made “clear error” standard 
rather than the “substantial evidence” standard in APA section 706(2)(E). 
In Dickinson v. Zurko, the Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit was 
required to apply the APA test.76 It emphasized that “[t]he APA was meant 
to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity.”77 
C. Non-APA Ripeness Doctrine to Limit Judicial Review
APA sections 702 and 704 together state that one “suffering legal 
wrong” or “adversely affected or aggrieved by” “final agency action for 
71. Darby v. Kemp, 957 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1992), rev’d sub nom. Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 
137 (1993); Missouri v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1987); Montgomery v. Rumsfeld, 572 F.2d 
250, 253–54 (9th Cir. 1978). But see Gulf Oil Corp. v. DOE, 663 F.2d 296, 308 & n.73 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); New Eng. Coal. on Nuclear Pollution v. NRC, 582 F.2d 87, 99 (1st Cir. 1978); United States 
v. Consol. Mines & Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 432, 439–40 (9th Cir. 1971). 
72. 509 U.S. 137 (1993). APA § 704 states: “Except as otherwise expressly required by
statute, agency action otherwise final is final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has 
been presented or determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsideration, 
or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action meanwhile is inoperative, 
for an appeal to superior agency authority.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018). 
73. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 101 (1st ed. 1958).
74. Darby, 509 U.S. at 145; KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 468–69 
(2d ed. 1983) (“The provision is relevant in hundreds of cases and is customarily overlooked.”). 
75. Darby, 509 U.S. at 143.
76. 527 U.S. 150 (1999). 
77. Id. at 155.
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which there is no adequate remedy in a court” is entitled to judicial 
review.78 Despite this, the Supreme Court has interposed the doctrine of 
“prudential ripeness” to balance “the fitness of the issues for judicial 
decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court 
consideration.”79 As Professor John Duffy has demonstrated, however, 
“ripeness doctrine has no place in the APA” because it “does not authorize 
balancing.”80 
D. Judicial Deference to Federal Agency Interpretations
The most spectacular examples of judges ignoring the APA are 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.81 and 
Auer v. Robbins.82 They respectively held, in effect, that federal courts 
must uphold federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous 
statutes and regulations. Neither case considered the APA’s provisions on 
judicial review, even though the APA’s language and legislative history at 
least suggest (if not outright prove) that Congress intended that judicial 
interpretation be de novo.83 
In the recent Kisor v. Wilkie, the Court attempted to reconcile Auer 
with the APA.84 The attempt fell short, however, for the Court failed to 
discuss what Professor Kenneth Culp Davis (a drafter of the APA85) had, 
78. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2018) (“A person suffering legal wrong 
because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of 
a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2018) (“Agency action made 
reviewable by statute and final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court 
are subject to judicial review.”). 
79. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
80. John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113, 162,
177 (1998). 
81. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
82. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
83. Principal APA drafter and House report author Rep. Francis Walter stated that section 706 
“requires courts to determine independently all relevant questions of law, including the interpretation 
of constitutional or statutory provisions.” STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT—LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1944-46, S. Doc. No. 248, at 370 (1946) 
(“APA-Leg.Hist.”) (emphasis added).  Both H.R. Rep. 79-1980, at 278 (1946), APA-Leg.Hist. 278, 
and S. Rep. 79-752, at 214 (1945), APA-Leg.Hist. 214, stated that “questions of law are for the courts 
rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis . . . .” For academic comment, see, e.g., Duffy, 
Administrative Common Law, supra note 80, 77 TEX. L. REV. at 194 (§ 706’s “plain language alone 
suggests de novo review.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE 
L.J. 969, 995 (1992) (“[A]ll” in § 706 “suggests that Congress contemplated courts would always 
apply independent judgment on questions of law.”).
84. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
85. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Approaches to Regulatory Reform in the United States: A Response to
the Remarks of Professors Levin and Freeman, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1893, 1893 (2005) (“[Kenneth Culp 
Davis] helped draft [the] APA.”); Paul Verkuil, Present at the Creation: Regulatory Reform Before 
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soon after Chevron’s issuance, identified as the most pertinent part of the 
APA on the deference issue—the word “all” in APA section 706.86 That 
provision, entitled “Scope of review,” states: “To the extent necessary to 
decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant 
questions of law . . . .”87 Professor Davis argued that Chevron is contrary 
to “all” in section 706 and is “the opposite of what Congress had 
legislated.”88 The word “all” never appeared in Kisor. 
The Court’s failure to come to grips with the issue is unfortunate, for 
a moment’s reflection would have revealed the inconsistency of deference 
with section 706. Under Chevron and Auer, courts decide two questions—
whether the statute or regulation is ambiguous; and, if so, whether the 
agency’s interpretation is reasonable. The court does not decide the key 
question—how the ambiguous statute or regulation is to be construed. 
Instead, the agency decides it.89 And that omission is contrary to the word 
“all,” which the Court failed to apply. For this reason, Kisor will not be 
the last word on the consistency of deference with the APA. 
IV. How Did We Get Here?
A. Counsel and Courts
Nearly all the blame for courts overlooking the APA lies with counsel, 
who frequently fail to cite APA provisions. But much blame must also be 
shouldered by the courts, who often fail to consult the APA for a rule of 
decision on administrative law questions. Judges raised in the common 
law tradition naturally gravitate to judge-made law. Judge-made law is 
also apt to be more finely grained, more attuned to the equities in a 
1946, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 509, 509–511 (1986). 
86. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES § 29:16-1, p. 509, § 29:16-
2, p. 510 (1989). 
87. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018) (emphasis added).
88. E.g., DAVIS, supra note 86, at 509–510 (“[T]he Court . . . ignored and violated the entirely
clear provision of . . . [APA] § 706 . . . that ‘the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of 
law.’ The contrast between the statutory words and the Court’s words could hardly be stronger . . . . 
The Court directly violated the clear statute.”). 
89. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Assn. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005)
(“If a statute is ambiguous, and if the implementing agency’s construction is reasonable, Chevron 
requires a federal court to accept the agency’s construction of the statute, even if the agency’s reading 
differs from what the court believes is the best statutory interpretation.”); id. at 983 (“Chevron teaches 
that a court’s opinion as to the best reading of an ambiguous statute an agency is charged with 
administering is not authoritative . . . the agency remains the authoritative interpreter (within the limits 
of reason) of such statutes.”) (alteration to the original); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 528 
(2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is to agency officials, not to the Members of this Court, that 
Congress has given discretion to choose among permissible interpretations of the statute.”). 
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particular case, and more likely to reflect a judge’s nuanced knowledge of 
legal administration. But in a democracy, none of these reasons can 
suffice. Unlike judge-made law, the APA is the consensus of the people’s 
representatives and must be applied even if not cited. 
Aside from political illegitimacy, the judge-made law of exclusivity 
can be criticized for other reasons. As the case law under the OSH Act 
illustrates, the courts’ exclusivity holdings have been complex, 
inconsistent, and unstable. Distinctions have been drawn between 
substantive and procedural challenges. One court has distinguished 
between employers who previously participated in rulemaking and pre-
enforcement challenge proceedings, and those who did not.90 Another 
court has hinted at a distinction between challenges to standards adopted 
under one rulemaking provision and another.91 None of these distinctions, 
however, rest on anything in the OSH Act’s language or legislative history. 
On the contrary, the OSH Act’s legislative history states with unusual 
clarity and without qualification that employers may challenge standards 
during enforcement.92 Worse, these distinctions have been drawn or 
suggested even when the court had been made aware of the OSH Act’s 
unqualified legislative history, and in one case even when APA 
section 703 was cited to the court.93 Not only do the distinctions rest solely 
on the judges’ ideas of good policy, but they also suffer from the lack of 
clarity typical of distinctions being hammered out in case law. For 
example, is an agency’s failure to make a statutorily required rulemaking 
finding that a regulation is “feasible” a procedural or a substantive defect? 
Worse, opinions have been internally inconsistent, and opinions within the 
same circuit have vacillated, sometimes with a panel appearing to be 
unaware of its own precedent. 
By contrast, the third sentence of APA section 703 is simple, clear, 
and provides an easily administered rule—one that draws none of the 
above distinctions. The situation brings to mind an observation by 
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis: “Altogether, the law made by judges seems 
90. RSR Corp. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 1984); see quotation in the text
accompanying supra note 31. 
91. Kiewit Pwr. Constr. Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 959 F.3d 381, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see supra
text accompanying notes 55–57. 
92. See quotation from the legislative history in the text accompanying supra note 29. 
93. See citations supra notes 50–53 to the employer’s supplemental brief in Kiewit Power,
959 F.3d at 392, which specifically cited APA § 703 to the court. Despite this, the court did not cite 
the statute. 
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to me clearly inferior to statutes and administrative rules in clarity, 
reliability, and freedom from conflict.”94 
B. Academia
Part of the problem may also be that academic scholarship on 
exclusivity has ignored the third sentence of APA section 703. 
In 1982, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) 
received a report on the exclusivity of pre-enforcement challenges by Paul 
Verkuil, a professor of administrative law at Tulane Law School.95 ACUS 
soon adopted a recommendation to Congress on the subject.96 The ACUS 
recommendation did not mention APA section 703’s third sentence. 
Professor Verkuil’s study mentioned APA section 703’s third 
sentence briefly but inaccurately. It stated that APA section 703 
“specifically recognizes . . . that enforcement review can be deemed 
precluded if an adequate opportunity for preenforcement review is 
presented.”97 The statement is inaccurate because it ignores section 703’s 
other key criterion—exclusivity. 
In 2011, Professor Verkuil’s study was celebrated in a festschrift by 
Ronald Levin, professor of administrative law at Washington University 
in St. Louis.98 Professor Levin’s paper is in much the same vein as 
Professor Verkuil’s. It too emphasized the word “adequate” but ignored 
section 703’s use of “exclusive.”99 
One might speculate that both scholars did not mention the word 
“exclusive” (or treated it as meaningless) because the judge-made doctrine 
followed by the courts had often implied exclusivity from adequacy alone. 
But the judge-made doctrine had been built without consideration of APA 
section 703. Professors Verkuil and Levin also failed to consider that to 
imply exclusivity from adequacy alone would not give exclusivity the 
independent status that its parallel use in section 703 signifies. 
94. Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed
Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1986). 
95. Paul R. Verkuil, Congressional Limitations on Judicial Review of Rules, 57 TUL. L. REV. 
733 (1983). 
96. Conference Recommendation 82-7, 47 Fed. Reg. 58,208 (Dec. 30, 1982) (formerly 
codified at 1 C.F.R. § 305.82-7 (1993)) (now available at www.acus.gov/recommendation/judicial-
review-rules-enforcement-proceedings (last visited Sept. 21, 2020)). 
97. Verkuil, supra note 95, at 760 (emphasis added). Nearly the same statement occurs at 754 
n.82 (Section 703 “contemplates that Yakus-type enforcement limitations might exist where adequate
opportunities for pre-enforcement review are present.”). 
98. Ronald M. Levin, Statutory Time Limits on Judicial Review of Rules: Verkuil Revisited, 
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2203, 2217 (2011). 
99. See id. at 2208.
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The Verkuil paper illustrates another way in which scholarship has 
fallen short on this subject. An early Supreme Court case often mentioned 
is Yakus v. United States.100 There, the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of section 204(d) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, which had 
expressly made a short pre-enforcement challenge period exclusive.101 The 
Court held that the provision was constitutional because it provided an 
“adequate” opportunity for pre-enforcement review. Professor Verkuil 
characterized APA section 703 as having been passed to “incorporate[] the 
‘adequacy’ standard of Yakus.”102 That may be so, but it again ignores that 
section 703 also expressly incorporated the statutory exclusivity criterion 
featured by the statute in Yakus.103 
V. Recommendations: What the Courts Need to Do
First, the Supreme Court should state plainly that, on administrative 
law questions, it is the duty of federal judges to consult the APA to 
determine whether it supplies a rule of decision and, if it does, to follow 
it, regardless of any previous judge-made law and regardless of any failure 
by the parties to have cited it. If needed to ensure fairness, courts should 
invite supplemental briefs. 
Although federal judges cannot be reasonably expected to know every 
corner of every statutory scheme, they can be reasonably expected to 
recognize when the APA applies to a question, just as they can be 
reasonably expected to know and apply the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This is especially true of the D.C. Circuit, which has been 
assigned a heavy load of administrative agency appeals. 
Second, courts must resist old habits and give primacy to statutes, not 
judge-made law. They should not try to shoe-horn APA provisions into 
judge-made law. Failing to treat the APA as the fount from which case law 
should freely develop on its own terms would be nearly as undemocratic 
100. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
101. Id.; Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, § 204(d), 56 Stat. 23, 33
(“Except as provided in this section, no court, Federal, State, or Territorial, shall have jurisdiction or 
power to consider the validity of any such regulation, order, or price schedule.”). 
102. Verkuil, supra note 95, at 741 n.34 (“The legislative history of the APA leaves little doubt
that this sentence, which incorporates the ‘adequacy’ standard of Yakus, was added to account for the 
possible reappearance of the EPCA judicial review solution in other statutes.”). 
103. A student paper posted on the internet in draft form and apparently slated for publication
by the George Washington Law Review, John Hindley, “Timing is Not the Enemy,” 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3504338 (last visited Oct. 14, 2020), is also in 
the same vein as the articles by Professors Verkuil and Levin. The thirty-eight-page-long typescript 
does not discuss APA section 703 until page 34, nearly entirely ignores the statute’s use of the word 
“exclusive,” and focuses on case law nearly to the exclusion of the statute. 
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and faithless to the constitutional roles of Congress and courts as outright 
ignoring the APA. Statutes should not be warped by case law that did not 
consider the congressional intent behind them. 
